Municipal Affairs—Relieving Insolvent Municipalities: New York’s Emergency Moratorium Act and Federal Bankruptcy Law by unknown




Municipalities: New York’s Emergency
Moratorium Act and Federal Bankruptcy Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Municipal Affairs—Relieving Insolvent Municipalities: New York’s Emergency Moratorium Act and Federal Bankruptcy Law, 15 Urb. L.
Ann. 351 (1978)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol15/iss1/14
RELIEVING INSOLVENT MUNICIPALITIES: NEW
YORK'S EMERGENCY MORATORIUM ACT
AND FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
New York City, one of several metropolitan areas threatened with
fiscal insolvency,' faced possible bankruptcy in 1975. In response to
the city's financial difficulties the New York legislature passed the
Emergency Moratorium Act (EMA) for the City of New York.' In
Ropico v. City of New York,' holders of New York City notes con-
tended that the EMA conflicted with the federal Bankruptcy Act's 4
1. In 1976 the average revenue per capita from local sources was $426 per resident
while the average per resident debt was $1,052 for cities of over one million in popu-
lation. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 5, 1976, at 51 (Bureau of the Census
statistics). See generally City Expenses Outstrio Income 2.7%, AM. CiTY & CoUNTY,
Dec., 1976, at 86.
2. 1975 N.Y. Laws (Extraordinary Session), ch. 874, as amendedbych. 875 (Con-
sol. 1976).
Section 3 of the Act provides that
* . . During the moratorium period, and notwithstanding any inconsistent pro-
visions of any law, general, special, or local, or of any agreement or short-term
obligation, no act shall be done, and no action or special proceeding shall be
commenced or continued in any court in any jurisdiction, seeking to apply or
enforce against the city, or any political subdivision, agency, instrumentality or
officer thereof, or their funds, property, receivables or revenues, any order, judg-
ment, lien, set-off or counterclaim on account of any short-term obligation, or the
indebtedness or liability evidenced thereby, or seeking the assessment, levy or
collection of taxes by or for the city or the application of any funds, property,
receivables or revenues of the city on account of any such short-term obligation,
or the indebtedness of liability evidenced thereby, although the payment of such
short-term obligations may be due by the terms thereof or any general or special
local law or agreement.
Id.
Section 4 provides that
During the moratoruim period, and notwithstanding any inconsistent provi-
sions of any law, general, special or local, or of any agreement or short-term
obligation, no action or special proceeding shall be commenced or continued
upon any short-term obligation, or any indebtedness or liability evidenced
thereby, although the payment of such short-term obligation may be due by the
terms thereof or any general or special local law or agreement.
Id.
3. 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 1-755, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (Supp. IV 1974).
See notes 16-18 infra.
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prohibition' against imposing compositions6 on unwilling creditors.
Rejecting this view, the ]opico court held that the EMA merely cre-
ated a lawful extension of New York City's debt without violating the
Bankruptcy Act composition provisions.'
The conflict in Ropico emerged following unsuccessful attempts by
the New York legislature to solve New York City's fiscal crisis.' In
1975, after failing to rescue the city through loans, the legislature
passed the EMA.9 The Moratorium suspended, for a period of three
years, all payments of principal on short-term notes which matured
in 1975 and 1976.10 Noteholders were given the option of exchang-
ing their notes with at least eight percent interest due for longer-term
obligations having an interest rate of at least six per cent. Notehold-
5. The proscription is contained in § 83(i), 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970).
6. A composition has been described as "an arrangement between an insolvent
and his creditors, whereby the creditors accept an amount equal to or less than the
whole of their claims, for the sake of some payment at a future time." Ellison, The
Recent Revision of the Federal Municpal Bankruptcy Statute: A Potential Reprievefor
Insolvent Cities? 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 549, 553 n.21 (1976). The term therefore refers
to both plans which contemplate reductions in payment and those plans, called "ex-
tensions," that provide for payment in full at a later time. Under Chapter IX, a
composition includes "provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors gener-
ally, or of any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through issuance of new
securities of any character, or otherwise." § 83(a), 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). This
description apparently includes extensions.
However, other areas of the Bankruptcy Act draw a distinction between composi-
tions and extensions. See, e.g., Chapter XIII, § 606(7), 11 U.S.C. § 1006(7) (1970)
(wage earners' plans); § 203, 11 U.S.C. § 603 (1970) (agricultural compositions and
extensions).
7. 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
8. The legislature decided to take action after the city, unable to sell its securities
on the market, faced default. In June 1975, the state advanced $800 million to the city.
425 F. Supp. at 973. Subsequently the legislature passed the New York State Munici-
pal Assistance Corporation Act. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3001-3040 (McKinney
Supp. 1977). This Act created the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), a "cor-
porate governmental agency and instrumentality of the state," authorized to raise
money for the city by issuing its own bonds. MAC bondholders enjoyed priority
over wage earners, welfare recipients, and other creditors in claiming revenues. 425
F. Supp. at 973.
9. In September 1975 the state legislature met in Extraordinary Session and passed
the New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, including
the EMA. 1975 N.Y. Laws (Extraordinary Session), Chapters 868-70 (Consol. 1976).
10. See note 2 supra. Additionally, the Emergency Financial Organization Act
called for the establishment of an Emergency Financial Control Board to supervise
the city's management and to institute a financial plan to restore the city financially
within three years. Id. §§ 5-8. The Act also established a wage freeze for those city
employees who had not already agreed to one. Id. § 10. Finally, the Act called for




ers who refused an exchange could receive six per cent interest, plus
any amount held necessary under state or federal law, on their ex-
isting notes until the principal was repaid."
Plaintiffs in Ropico contended that the EMA violated section 83(i)
of the Bankruptcy Act.' 2 Section 83(i) provides that, "no state law
prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness shall be binding
upon any creditor who does not consent to such composition, and no
judgment shall be entered which would bind a creditor to such a
composition without his consent."' 3 The creditor-plaintiffs argued
that the EMA constituted a state-imposed composition in conffict
with the federal bankruptcy power and must be void as pre-empted
by federal law.' 4
Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 governs municipal
bankruptcy law. This chapter, 5 known as the Municipal Bank-
11. MAC offered private noteholders an exchange of maturing notes for MAC
bonds due July 1, 1986, at 8% interest. Noteholders who did not accept these condi-
tions were foreclosed from instituting action on the bonds until the Act's expiration
date, November 15, 1978. 425 F. Supp. at 975.
12. § 83(i), 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970).
In addition to the Bankruptcy Act challenge, plaintiffs argued that the EMA im-
posed an impairment of contract in violation of the Contract Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The court upheld the act, finding a modification of the method of
repayment rather than an impairment of credit. 425 F. Supp. at 976-77. Plaintiffs
also alleged a deprivation of property without due process of law, a claim summarily
rejected by the court on the basis of the state's overriding police power in time of
emergency. Id. at 977. A third argument, that the EMA violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by denying short-term noteholders rights enjoyed by unaffected creditors,
was rejected upon a finding of a rational basis for the classification. The court held
that the urgency of repaying maturing short-term notes over other city obligations
justified the classification. 1d. at 977-78. Additionally the court rejected a challenge
to the EMA under the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 978. See note 38 infra for
discussion of full faith and credit challenges to the EMA.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970).
14. 425 F. Supp. at 978-81. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is a legislative exercise of
the federal bankruptcy power. The Constitution renders the federal government
supreme power over bankruptcy. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. All provisions of Chapter
IX are superior to state bankruptcy laws in conflict with that chapter. West Coast
Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. dene4 311 U.S.
717 (1941).
Where a state law conflicts with a federal law, the federal law is supreme and the
state law is pre-empted. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). For studies on pre-emption, see Note, Con-
ceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22 J. PuB. L. 391 (1973);
Note, Preemption Doctrine- Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
15. Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 81-84, 11 U.S.C. § 401-404, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 317 (1976).
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ruptcy Act, establishes procedures by which local taxing agencies
may settle with creditors through composition. Due to the essential
nature of the local agencies and the services they perform, the Bank-
ruptcy Act denies agencies the option to cease operating.' 6 Prior to
1975, Chapter II received little attention, since its provisions were ap-
plied almost exclusively to local service districts.17
Section 83(i) as originally enacted did not require creditor assent to
any composition.' 8 The section was designed to ensure that the Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy Act would not impermissibly interfere with tradi-
tional state control over municipalities.' 9 The Supreme Court in
Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City ofAsbury Park2' held that the origi-
nal section 83(i) did not affect state laws governing municipal insol-
vency. In Faitoute, the Court found a New Jersey Act requiring
creditors to accept a later maturity date and lower interest rates to be
consistent with the original section 83(i).2 Congress, however, over-
ruled Faitoute by enacting a proviso to section 83(i).22 This proviso,
prohibiting compositions without the consent of creditors, was
designed to protect creditors' rights and to ensure uniformity of those
16. Sections 81-84, 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-404 (1970). Although a municipal corpora-
tion, unlike other corporations, may not go out of business, it may file a plan of com-
position in bankruptcy. Chapter IX prescribes the procedures and rules for such
composition. The purpose of Chapter IX is to provide an insolvent municipality with
a forum in which to meet with its creditors and develop a plan mutually beneficial to
both debtor and creditor. H.R. REp. No. 207, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
17. Congress enacted Chapter IX during the Depression after many small towns
and service districts defaulted on their obligations. Most Chapter IX litigation has
involved such service districts and small cities. Patterson, Municipal Debt Adjust-
ment Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA. L. Rav. 520, 522 (1942).
18. The section read in its entirety: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall be
construed to limit or impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or other-
wise, any municipality or any political subdivision of or in such State in the exercise
of its political or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor." Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, § 83(i), 50 Stat. 659 (1937) (amended 1946, current version at 11 U.S.C. §
403(i) (1970)).
19. Section 83(i) was added to the Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937 after the
original act was declared an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereignty. Ash-
ton v. County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
20. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
21. The plan approved by the Court in Faitoutewas accepted by only 85% of the
city's creditors. The Court, however, found that the state act could override the
rights of the dissenting creditors. Id at 513-14.
22. See text accompanying note 13 supra. See generaity Hearings on H.R. 4307
Before the Subcont on Bankruptcy & Reorganization of the House Coma of the Judci-





The distinction between a composition and an extension has not
been considered in Chapter IX litigation. Section 83(a) defines a
plan of composition as including "provisions modifying or altering
the fights of creditors generally."24  Other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act deal with the difference between the two terms. 25 Most
litigation has involved section 14c(5), 26 providing that a debtor may
not obtain two arrangements by way of composition within a six-year
period.2 7 The Supreme Court in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co. 28 held
23. H.R. REP. No. 2246, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), reprinted in [1946] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1246, 1249. Since the term "extension" is not mentioned
in Chapter IX, it may be assumed that extensions are not prohibited. For example,
cases dealing with § 14c(5), I1 U.S.C. § 32c(5), (1970) (providing that a prior dis-
charge by composition bars another such discharge within six years) adopt this con-
struction. See Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
Several courts have construed § 83(i), I 1 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970). Faitoute Iron &
Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Wells Fargo Bank & Trust Co.
v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 136 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 787 (1944);
Leco Properties, Inc. v. R.E. Crummer & Co., 128 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942); Spellings
v. Dewey, 122 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1941); Mission Ind. School Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d
175 (5th Cir. 1940); West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 654 (9th
Cir. 1940), cert. denie4 311 U.S. 717 (1941); InreDallas Levee Improvement Dist., 63
F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Tex. 1948); In reSummer Lake Irr. Dist., 33 F. Supp. 504 (D. Ore.
1940); In reFort Lauderdale, 23 F. Supp. 229 (D. Fla. 1938); In reDrainage Dist. 7,
21 F. Supp. 798 (D. Ark. 1937); Peoples State Bank v. Imperial Irr. Dist., 15 Cal. 2d
397, 101 P.2d 466, (1940).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970).
25. Some chapters, including Chapter XI, contain provisions applying to composi-
tions and extensions alike. Other chapters, however, contain provisions which per-
tain only to extensions and do not mention compositions. See, e.g., § 75(i), I 1 U.S.C.
§ 203(i) (1970) (procedures for filing petitions of extension under Chapter VIII). In
several cases dealing with that section, however, distinctions between the two terms
were made. In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Hoag, 62 F.
Supp. 527 (D. Vt. 1945); Heldstab v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y., 91 F.2d 655 (10th
Cir. 1937). The court in In re Hoag, construing § 75(k), 11 U.S.C. § 203(k), held that
"[a]ltogether neither of these terms are defined by the Act, it seems to be generally
assumed in the decisions that a composition is an agreement for the payment of a
certain percentage of a creditor's claim in full satisfaction, while an extension contem-
plates an agreement extending the time within which a claim is to be paid." 62 F.
Supp. at 530.
26. § 14c(5), 11 U.S.C. § 32c(5) (1970).
27. Some courts held that § 14c(5) was applicable to extensions as well as composi-
tions. See In re Schageter, 319 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1963); In re Jensen, 200 F.2d 58
(7th Cir. 1952); In re Fontan, 227 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Miss. 1964); In re Nicholson,
224 F. Supp. 773 (D. Ore. 1963); In re Bingham, 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960),
aft'd, 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961). Other courts felt that only compositions, not
extensions, were barred. See Edins v. Helzeberg's Diamond Shops, Inc., 315 F.2d
223 (10th Cir. 1963); In re Holmes, 309 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962); In re Sharp, 205 F.
19781
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that section 14c(5) does not bar an extension plan regardless of a
prior discharge obtained within a six-year period in bankruptcy by
way of composition.29 The Court ruled that extension plans are dif-
ferent from plans of composition, finding that in the latter only part
payment for the debt is contemplated. Extensions, on the other
hand, do not involve a discharge in actuality since they ultimately
provide for full payment of the debt.3"
The court in Ropico confronted two issues. First, it addressed the
applicability of the Perry rule to section 83(i). Second, the court
faced the contention that any decrease in interest owing to the credi-
tors would impair section 83(i) rights.3 '
The Ropico court, finding no Chapter IX precedents construing the
extension/composition distinction, looked to both general bank-
ruptcy law and to Perry.3 2 The court applied the Perry rule, finding
Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962); In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), a]f'd sub
nonm Fishman v. Verlin, 255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958). The Supreme Court resolved
this conflict by finding a distinction between a composition and extension under §
14c(5). Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
28. 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
29. In Perry, a debtor filed a petition for extension of time in which to pay his
debts out of future wages. He had previously filed a petition in straight bankruptcy
and obtained a discharge within six years of his second petition.
30. Id.
31. Plaintiffs argued that the reduction in principal from eight to six per cent made
the case indistinguishable from Faitoute and thus in violation of § 83(i). 425 F.
Supp. at 982. They also contended that the suspension of the right to receive the
principal due on a short-term note amounted to an impairment of the value of the
obligation, similar to a partial cancellation or surrender. Id. at 983.
32. The necessity and propriety of looking outside Chapter IX for guidance is an
interesting issue in the case. The court apparently found the § 83(a) description of a
composition inadequate to base a decision. See note 6 supra. Court decisions have
made it clear that because cities are of a different status from other debtors, not all
constructions of general bankruptcy law are applicable to Chapter IX. For example,
Chapter IX "insolvency" is not given the same meaning under general bankruptcy
law. For purposes of Chapter IX, inability to pay debts as they mature is sufficient
for insolvency, while in other chapters insolvency occurs when liabilities exceed as-
sets. See In re Corcoran Irr. Dist., 27 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Cal. 1939), a fd sub nom,
Newhouse v. Corcoran Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
717 (1941).
The court's use of general bankruptcy law may be justified in view of Congress'
utilization of Chapters X and XI as models for amendments to the Municipal Bank-
ruptcy Act in 1976. For example, provisions in the new act relating to satisfaction of
claims from executory contracts, § 88(c), 11 U.S.C. § 408(c) (1976) are borrowed from
Chapter X. For review of the new Chapter IX, see Bond, MunicoalBankruptcy Under
the 1976 Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1




that the EMA, by calling for full payment of principal over a longer
period of time, created an extension and not a composition.33
The court next confronted plaintiffs' assertion that the EMA cre-
ated a composition despite its characterization under the Perry rule.
Plaintiffs argued that the reduction of loan interest from eight to six
per cent constituted a composition. Despite the absence of any di-
rectly relevant case law,34 several cases involving non-interest-bear-
ing debts provided useful direction. Plans in which no interest was
provided for during the extension period were viewed as extensions.35
The Ropico court reasoned that if non-interest-bearing debts may be
extended without interest, the reduction to a six per cent rate contem-
plated by the EMA would be acceptable for the duration of the mora-
torium provided full interest was paid upon original maturity. The
court found that since the EMA demanded full eight per cent interest
payment until the maturity date, the plan was not a composition
within the meaning of section 83(i).36
The court also considered the financial disaster facing New York
City. Although the presence of such an emergency could not save an
unconstitutional act, the court recognized the state's interest in aiding
Potential Reprievefor Insolvent Cities? 13 HARv. J. LEGIS. 549 (1976); Patchan & Col-
lins, 1976 Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 31 U. MiAMi L. REV. 287 (1977). The new
Chapter IX does not affect the outcome of the Ropico case since § 83(i) was un-
changed by the 1976 Amendments.
33. 425 F. Supp. at 983. Discounting special circumstances such as the reduction
in interest, the distinction between the two terms here seems straightforward, and
probably falls under Perry. See Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp.,
84 Misc. 2d 976 (1975), af'd, 52 App. Div. 2d 84 (1975), rey'd on other grounds, 40
N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). In Flushing a New York City
creditor challenged the Moratorium Act under both § 83(i) and state law. See note
38 infra.
34. Plaintiffs cited Faitoute, in which there was no reduction in principal, noting
that the § 83(i) proviso was enacted to modify that ruling. However, the court
deemed Faitoute distinguishable since those noteholders had to accept a reduced rate
of interest before and after the maturity date, while under the EMA full interest was
paid up to the maturity date. 425 F. Supp. at 982-83.
35. In several cases plans were approved as extensions in which no interest was
offered at all during the extension period. See In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp. 660
(E.D.N.Y. 1957), aft'dsub nona Fisherman v. Verlin, 255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958);
Heldstab v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 91 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1937); In re Mahaley,
187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
36, 425 F. Supp. at 982-83. The court noted that "[i]t can be argued that the
suspension of the right to receive a short-term note may in some cases be in effect an
impairment of the value of the underlying obligation-similar to a partial cancella-
tion or surrender." Id. at 983. In this case, however, the court found that no substan-
tial impairment had occurred.
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its cities in times of fiscal crisis.37
The Ropico court's characterization of the EMA as an extension
despite its reduction of interest rates raises several problems. Al-
though the court recognized that some plans labeled as extensions
might be more appropriately termed "compositions," it made no at-
tempt to resolve this confusion.38 The precedents cited by the court
from other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act also fail to address this
question.39 Furthermore, the Ropico court's reliance on cases in-
volving non-interest-bearing debt moratoria is questionable given the
interest-earning obligations involved here.4
The failure to clearly distinguish an extension from a composition
may lie in the court's refusal to consider the effect of lower interest
rates imposed on the plaintiff noteholders by the extension. The im-
pact of inflation on creditors' rights seems relevant, given the 1975
37. The court noted that "a federal court decision that the federal Bankruptcy Act
precludes the New York State legislature from implementing this emergency measure
aimed at dealing with a fiscal crisis of unprecedented proportions affecting its largest
city would raise very serious questions about the right of a state effectively to govern
its political subdivisions." Id. at 984. With no binding legal precedents, the court
was free to be influenced by such factors as the imminence of default.
38. 425 F. Supp. at 983. It is interesting to note that the EMA was later held to be
in violation of the New York State Constitution in denying full faith and credit to the
city's notes. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358
N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976). See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. The Flushing
court reasoned that it was unfair to deprive short-term noteholders of remedies for
three years, and that such a substantial modification of creditors' rights was prohib-
ited by the full faith and credit clause.
Arguably the full faith and credit clause is analagous to the Bankruptcy Act's pro-
scription against compositions on unwilling creditors: both resist substantial changes
in creditors' rights which lessen the value of their notes. Perhaps the different foci of
the Flushing and Ropico courts may explain their inconsistent results. In Flushing
the court focused on the creditors' interests while the Ropico court looked to the city's
needs. For further studies of New York City's crisis and the Flushing case, see
Freilich, Munic pal Finance: State Courts, the Contract Clause, and the Police Power, 9
URn. LAW. vii (1977); Note, Municipal Coryorations-a State's Police Power Does Not
Allow the Alteration of the Payment Ters of Short-Term Munic~pal Notes, 81 DIcK.
L. Rnv. 866 (1977); Note, The Limits of State Intervention in a Municipal Fiscal Crisis,
4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1976).
39. In the cases involving § 88(c), 11 U.S.C. § 203 (1976), the composition-exten-
sion concept was not at issue. See note 35 supra.
40. All the cases cited by the court involved non-interest-bearing debts. See, e.g.,
In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), afT'd sub nom. Fishman v. Verlin,
255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958); Heldstab v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe'y., 91 F.2d 655
(10th Cir. 1937); In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Cal. 1960). Since there is no
reduction in interest in non-interest-bearing debts, those cases are distinguishable




inflation rate of 9. 1%. 1 At the six per cent interest rate contemplated
by the EMA,4 2 the noteholders would be losing money. The plain-
tiffs, however, failed to raise this issue.43
The court noted that the EMA did not impair prematurity inter-
est,44 yet this is not a compelling distinction. The crux of a composi-
tion is that the creditors' rights are impaired. The fact that full
interest is paid until maturity of the note does not seem to be a practi-
cal distinction since creditors can lose as much in interest reduction
after maturity as before maturity. Such a distinction not being deter-
minative, the Ropico case could have reached either result.45  Per-
haps this best explains the refusal of the court to set any guidelines as
to when a moratorium ceases to be an extension and becomes a com-
position.4 6
Finally, the fact that the Ropico court was willing to take into ac-
count the financial emergency facing New York may be of great im-
portance to cities facing similar problems. Such consideration of
financial distress is consonant with recent liberalization of the Munic-
ipal Bankruptcy Act.47 Although the holding of the case may be re-
41. The rate of inflation reached a high of 12.7% in February 1977 and has de-
creased since then. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer
Price Index (1977).
42. See text accompanying note I 1 supra.
43. The court might have been able to compare the circumstances to Perry v.
Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966), involving non-interest-bearing debts and
an inflation rate of two to four per cent. With such a comparison, a six per cent rate
would not seem unfair in the face of less than ten per cent inflation. 425 F. Supp. at
983.
44. 425 F. Supp. at 982-83.
45. The possibility of default by New York City may have been a controlling con-
sideration in the court's decision. It seems clear that creditors' rights were affected in a
material way and the court's distinction between Ropico and Faitoute is superfluous.
Yet this distinction provided the court with a standard by which to determine the
difference between a composition and an extension.
Though the decision may seem arbitrary, it is consonant with legislative trends.
Seenote 47 infra
46. The court recognized that the distinction between composition and extension
16must at some point, because of the length of the extension or the rate of interest after
maturity, become blurred." 425 F. Supp. at 983.
47. The 1976 Act relaxes the procedures for filing in bankruptcy. Before the
amendments, an insolvent municipality needed consent of the creditors of 51% of its
obligations before it could file in bankruptcy. § 83(a), 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1976). This
requirement is eliminated under the 1976 Amendments. New Chapter IX also does
away with the required submission of a list of the city's creditors with the petition
(originally a requirement under § 83(a), since many municipal obligations are in
bearer form and location of creditors is thus impractical).
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stricted to emergency situations, it is a valuable precedent for other
legislatures that may contemplate similar extension plans, and is an
important step in the development of the law of municipal bank-
ruptcy.48
Rosaynn Van Heest
Under § 82(e) of new Chapter IX, filing in bankruptcy acts as an automatic stay of
all proceedings against the municipality. Prior to the recent amendments of Chapter
IX, § 83(c) had provided for such stay only after filing and a hearing upon notice. A
new requirement concerning creditor acceptance of the bankruptcy plan has been in-
stituted, however, indicating that safeguards of creditors are still important. In addi-
tion, to the old requirement under § 83(d) that holders of two-thirds of the amount of
claims in each class agree to the discharge, § 92(b) now mandates that over 50% of the
number of claims must confirm.
Under the new Chapter IX the bankruptcy court is given authority to reject execu-
tory contracts and unexpired leases (§ 82(b)(1)), to issue certificates of indebtedness
having priority over all obligations other than the city's operating expenses (§
82(b)(2)) and to appoint a trustee for the city (§ 85(a)).
48. However, the New York City experience may lead to increased regulation of
municipal securities to avoid similar occurrences in the future. At present, munici-
palities are subject to relatively few securities laws-the anti-fraud provisions (§ 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(e) and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)), and registration requirements (§ 11 of the Securities Act 15
U.S.C. § 77k). Several bills have been introduced to require greater disclosure by
municipalities when issuing bonds. A House bill would amend the Securities Ex-
change Act to require preparation of annual reports by cities with $50 million in out-
standing securities. H.R. 2724, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1977). These would
include a list of unsatisfied obligations, financial statements, and a description of the
city's taxpayers. In addition to annual reports, the bill would require disclosure of
both creditors' priorities and the security for the debt. For studies of municipal se-
curities regulations and proposals, see Casey & Smith, New Look at Muncfval
Bonds-Disclosure Responsibilities in the Municipal Bond Marke4 50 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 639 (1976); Doty, Municial Disclosures-Recent Developmeng 9 URB. LAW. vii
(1977); Doty & Peterson, Federal Securities Laws and Transactions in Municpal
Securities, 71 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 283 (1976); Note, Future of Nonguaranteed Bond Fi-
nancing in New York, 45 FORDHAM L. RaV. 860 (1977); Note, Federal Regulation of
Municipal Securities, 60 MrNN. L. Rnv. 567 (1976); Note, Securities: Constitutional
Limitations upon Federal Regulation of Municipal Issuers, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 565
(1977); Note, Disclosure by Issuers of Municipal Securities: An Analysis oRecent Pro-
posals and a SuggestedApproach, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1017 (1976).
[Vol. 15:351
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol15/iss1/14
